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#cli#bitwarden#password#https#keepass#com#github#manager#don#npm
Discussion Sentiment
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Discussion (159 Comments)Read Original on HackerNews
Setting min-release-age=7 in .npmrc (needs npm 11.10+) would have protected the 334 unlucky people who downloaded the malicious @bitwarden/cli 2026.4.0, published ~19+ hours ago (see https://www.npmjs.com/package/@bitwarden/cli?activeTab=versi... and select "show deprecated versions").
Same story for the malicious axios (@1.14.1 and @0.30.4, removed within ~3h), ua-parser-js (hours), and node-ipc (days). Wouldn't have helped with event-stream (sat for 2+ months), but you can't win them all.
Some examples (hat tip to https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47513932):
p.s. shameless plug: I was looking for a simple tool that will check your settings / apply a fix, and was surprised I couldn't find one, I released something (open source, free, MIT yada yada) since sometimes one click fix convenience increases the chances people will actually use it. Link in bio if anyone is interested.EDIT: looks like someone else had a similar drive to make cooldowns cool again, worth bookmarking as well: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47878147
You're still pulling a lot of dependencies. At least they're pinned though.
https://lib.rs/crates/rbw
Takes what, maybe 15 seconds to compile on a high-core machine from scratch? Isn't the end of the world.
Worse is the scope to have to review all those things, if you'd like to use it for your main passwords, that'd be my biggest worry. Luckily most are well established already as far as I can tell.
I promptly removed the bw cli programme after that, and I definitely won't be installing it again.
I use ghostty if it matters.
I found the default bwcli clunky and unacceptable, and it's why I don't use it, even though I still have a BitWarden subscription.
They probably caused it themselves, somehow, and then blamed bitwarden. Note in the original comment they aren't even entirely sure what the command was, and they weren't familiar with it or they wouldn't have been surprised by its output... so how can they be sure what else they did between that command and the weechat thing?
If the terminal or tmux fed terminal history into weechat, that's also not bw's problem.
There is a time and place for where it makes sense and a password manager CLI written in TypeScript importing hundreds of third-party packages is a direct red flag. It is a frequent occurrence.
We have seen it happen with Axios which is one of the biggest supply chain attacks on the Javascript / Typescript ecosystem and it makes no sense to build sensitive tools with that.
Quite bizarre to think much much of my well-being depends on those secrets staying secret.
If you're used to the clunkier workflow of copy-pasting from a separate app, then it's much easier to absent-mindedly repeat it for a not-quite-right url.
I have 1Password configured to require password to unlock once per 24 hours. Rest of the time I have it running in the background or unlock it with TouchID (on the MacBook Pro) or FaceID (on the iPhone).
It also helps that I don’t really sign into a ton of services all the time. Mostly I log into HN, and GitHub, and a couple of others. A lot of my usage of 1Password is also centered around other kinds of passwords, like passwords that I use to protect some SSH keys, and passwords for the disk encryption of external hard drives, etc.
(plug: released a small CLI to auto-configure these — https://depsguard.com — I tried to find something that will help non developers quickly apply recommended settings, and couldn't find one)
My two most precious digital possessions - my email and my Bitwarden account - are protected by a Yubikey that's always on my person (and another in another geographical location). I highly recommend such a setup, and it's not that much effort (I just keep my Yubikey with my house keys)
I got a bit scared reading the title, but I'm doing all I can to be reasonably secure without devolving into paranoia.
That password cannot be cracked because it will always display as ** for anyone else.
My password is *****. See? It shows as asterisks so it's totally safe to share. Try it!
... Scnr •́ ‿ , •̀
So bold and so cowards at the same time...
obvious misdirection, but it does serve to make it very obvious it was a state actor.
Lol no, lots of groups do this, non-state ones too.
I've managed to avoid several security breaches in last 5 years alone by using KeePass locally on my own infra.
Bitwarden vaults were not compromised, there was a problem in a tool you used to access the secrets.
What makes it impossible for KeePass access tools to have these issues?
To date there have been zero instances when I needed to significantly change a password/service/login/credential solely from my phone and I was unable to access my laptop.
Additionally the file gets synchronized to a workstation that sits in my home office accessible by personal VPN, where it can be accessed in a shell session with the keepass CLI: https://tracker.debian.org/pkg/kpcli
You can use an extremely wide variety of your own choice of secure methods for how to get the file from the primary workstation (desktop/laptop) to your phone.
Plus, now you're responsible for everything. Backups, auditing etc.
https://cyberpress.org/hackers-exploit-keepass-password-mana...
This wasn't a case where KeePass was compromised in any way, as far as I can tell. This appears to be a basic case of a threat actor distributing a trojanized version via malicious ads. If users made sure they are getting the correct version, they were never in danger. That's not to say that a supply chain attack couldn't affect KeePass, but this article doesn't say that it has.
Long term keepass users aren't going to be affected. If you mention software to others make sure you send them a link to a known safe download location instead of having them search for one (as new users searching like that are more at risk of stumbling on a malicious copy of the official site hosting a hacked version).
It's only a matter of time until _they_ are also popped :(.
> The beacon established command and control over HTTPS
https://github.com/raycast/extensions/blob/6765a533f40ad20cc...
Keep the password manager as a separate desktop app and turn off auto update.
I wrote a version in Python and then rust back before the official CLI was released. Now you can use https://github.com/doy/rbw instead, much better maintained (since I don't use Bitwarden anymore).
Edit: The CLI itself apparently does not, which will have limited the damage a bit, but if it's installed as a snap, it might. Incidents like this should hopefully cause a rollback of this dumb system of forcefully and frequently updating people's software without explicit consent.
Also the time range provided in https://community.bitwarden.com/t/bitwarden-statement-on-che... can help with knowing if you were at risk. I only used the CLI once in the morning yesterday (ET), so I might not have been affected?
Assuming you had it already installed, you would be safe.
I've also been preferring to roll things on my own in my side projects rather than pulling a package. I'll still use big, standalone libraries, but no more third-party shims over an API, I'll just vibe code the shim myself. If I'm going to be using vibe code either way, better it be mine than someone else's.
https://github.com/remorses/sigillo
It is:
- open source
- accountless(keys are identity)
- using a public git backend making it easily auditable
- easy to self host, meaning you can easily deploy it internally
- multisig, meaning event if GitHub account is breached, malevolent artifacts can be detected
- validating a download transparantly to the user, which only requires the download url, contrary to sigstore
> Bitwarden’s Chrome extension, MCP server, and other legitimate distributions have not been affected yet.
It is mind boggling how an app that just lists a bunch of items can be so bloated.
The irony! The security "solution" is so often the weak link.
Also didn't Microsoft (the owner of GitHub) got access to Claude Mythos in order to "seCuRe cRitiCal SoftWaRe InfRasTructUre FoR teh AI eRa"? Hows securing GitHub Action going for them?
Meanwhile, Bitwarden themselves state that end users were almost never affected: https://community.bitwarden.com/t/bitwarden-statement-on-che...
You had to install the CLI through NPM at a very short time frame for it to be affected. If you did get infected, you have to assume all secrets on your computer were accessed and that any executable file you had write access to may be backdoored.
Praying to the security gods.
It seems like we've have non-stop supply chain attacks for months now?
If you see any package that has hundreds of libraries, that increases the risk of a supply chain attack.
A password manager does not need a CLI tool.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47585838
A password manager absolutely does need a CLI tool??
Not to mention that a graphical application is just as vulnerable to supply chain attacks.
Why not? Even macos keychain supports cli.
I don't think macOS Keychain uses NPM and it isn't in TypeScript or Javascript and, yes it does not need a CLI either.
The NPM and Java/Typescript ecosystem is part of the problem that encourages developers to import hundreds of third-party libraries, due to its weak standard library which it takes at least ONE transitive dependency to be compromised and it is game over.
That's a wild statement. The CLI is just another UI.
The problem in this case is JS and the NPM ecosystem. Go would be an improvement, but complexity is the enemy of security. Something like (pass)age is my preference for storing sensitive data.